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mechanisms, achieved an alliance 
success rate of 50%, somewhat below 
average for the entire database. These 
mechanisms do not seem to improve 
competence but, rather, mirror 
confidence. Firms that, in contrast, 
extensively used integrating 
mechanisms realized an alliance 
success rate of 71% on average.
 Managers often talk about how they 
tolerate productive mistakes—errors 
employees and the company learn 
from. In the case of alliances, my 
research suggests, mere tolerance is 
probably not enough. Managers should 
create mechanisms that encourage 
thoughtful trial-and-error approaches 
and deliberate lesson sharing. 
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Many studies conclude that the more alliances a company 
forms, the better it becomes at them. That makes intuitive 
sense—but it’s not always true.
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“What, then, determines whether a firm that 
actively pursues alliances will perform well?”
My own study of nearly 200 firms, which 
collectively had formed more than 
3,400 alliances, found that on average 
the results of firms with the most 
experience were worse than those of 
firms with only moderate experience, 
as gauged by the percentage of 
alliances that achieved their goals.  
 Previous research has suggested 
that firms with a lot of experience can 
become overconfident of their skills and 
be misled by “superstitious learning”—
learning based on unsupported notions 
about cause and effect. Often these 
firms have sophisticated, centralized 
alliance functions that codify and 
enforce standard practices. But if some 
of those practices draw on superstitious 
ideas about what specific actions 
account for good or bad outcomes, 
firms can perpetuate suboptimal 
practices, inhibit learning, and 
undermine alliance performance.
 What, then, determines whether a 
firm that actively pursues alliances will 
perform well? My findings suggest that 
it is the nature of the firm’s alliance 
mechanisms. The greater its alliance 
experience, the more likely it is to have 
institutionalizing mechanisms, which 
formalize decision making and enforce 
standardized practices such as 
protocols for selecting partners. But 
what those mechanisms offer in 
efficiency they lack in flexibility, 
particularly when it comes to learning 
from successes and mistakes that are 
clearly associated with specific actions. 
That’s where integrating mechanisms 
can offer insight. They encourage 
employees to share experiences 
from previous alliances and engage in 
group problem solving, nurturing a 
collaborative mind-set and willingness 
to improvise. This fosters 
experimentation and allows companies 
to adapt practices to new contexts—
processes that promote truly effective 
practices and continual improvement.
 Most of the companies I studied use 
both institutionalizing and integrating 
mechanisms. How they balanced the 
two seemed to be a key to success. 
The highly experienced firms, which 
relied predominantly on institutionalizing 
